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Abstract
We study whether proximity to the nearest tax haven affects FDI and the number of
American affiliates in a tax haven. Our results show that distance to the nearest tax haven
is positively related to FDI inflows and the number of American affiliates in tax havens.
These findings suggest that there is a harmful competition between tax havens. We also
find evidence of positive spillovers: the number of American affiliates in a tax haven is
positively related to the number of in its closest neighboring tax haven. This suggests the
presence of agglomeration benefits given there is an affiliate in a nearby tax haven.
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1. Introduction
Over the past decade, economic globalization has led to a significant increase in
capital mobility and a corresponding increase in demand for tax haven operations. For
example, Kudrle (2008) reported a 154 percent growth in total liabilities from 1998 to
2006 for a sample of 20 tax havens. Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is
considered to be an important factor for stimulating economic growth for both developed
and developing countries (Dash and Sharma, 2011; Lee, 2005; Nissan and Niroomand,
2010). Fearing the harmful impacts of tax haven policies, OECD countries launched the
1998 Harmful Tax Competition (HTC) initiatives. Following the policy focus, research
has investigated the impact of tax haven policies on non-tax havens.
The implication of tax competition for tax havens, themselves, is also important
for the international dialogue. To the extent that competition is a race to the bottom, tax
haven countries would have reason to support calls for international tax policy
coordination. If competition is a race to the top, then tax havens would have little reason
to seek international tax harmonization. Although the related literature has addressed the
efficacy of tax haven policies, it has largely ignored the dynamics of tax competition
between tax havens.
We address this omission in the literature by analyzing tax competition between
tax havens paying special attention to physical proximity of countries. On one hand,
increased distance to the nearest tax haven acts as a buffer against competitive pressure.
On the other hand, closer proximity increases the potential for capital agglomeration and
spillovers between tax havens. Recent empirical studies by Desai, Foley, and Hines
(2007a,b), Rose and Spiegel (2007), and Blanco and Rogers (2009) find proximity to tax
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havens to be beneficial for non-tax haven countries.1 To our knowledge, however, no
research investigates the influence of proximity on other tax havens.
In this article, we postulate that tax havens compete with other tax havens for
foreign investment and that spatial proximity affects the nature of the competition. Our
objective is to empirically evaluate the extent to which geographic proximity to other tax
havens influences multinational investment flows. Using a panel data estimation
framework, we consider two outcome measures: FDI inflows and the number of America
affiliates. We build off of previous literature by adding spatial proximity measures to the
group of factors found to be related to these measures of foreign investment.2 Our
analysis provides evidence regarding the extent of competition and spillover effects
among tax havens.
Using panel data for tax haven countries, we find that FDI inflows and the
number of American affiliates are positively related to the distance to the closest tax
haven.3 Combined these findings imply that tax competition has negative (beggar-thyneighbor type) effects on tax havens in terms of competing for mobile capital. Turning to
analysis of the location of American affiliates, we find evidence of agglomeration and
spillover effects. The number of American affiliates in a tax haven is positively related to
the number in the closest neighboring tax haven. This is consistent with the spatial
patterns we find when we investigate the location decisions of the top 500 American
firms. Namely, there is a positive relationship between the number of American affiliates
1

Rose and Spiegel (2007) investigate impacts of off-shore financial centers while Desai, Foley, and Hines
(2007a,b) and Blanco and Rogers (2009) evaluate tax havens more generally.
2
Lee (2005) discusses the more prominent factors found in the extensive literature on the determinants of
FDI.
3
As described below, tax havens included in the sample vary slightly across specifications. We include
annual observations for 18 tax havens during the period 1991-2005 in the analysis of FDI and observations
for 19 tax havens during the period 1999-2005 for the analysis of American affiliates.
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in a tax haven and the number in its nearest tax haven neighbor. This supports the
argument that agglomeration benefits are important when firms are deciding where to
locate subsidiaries. From the perspective of tax havens, these results suggest that there is
a benefit to being closer to another tax haven that already has an American subsidiary.
This paper is organized as follow: Section 2 reviews the literature on tax havens
and tax competition, Section 3 presents the data and methodology used to study
competition between tax havens, Section 4 discusses the results obtained from the
empirical analysis, and Section 5 concludes.

2. Current Understanding of Tax Havens and Tax Competition
According to the OECD, a sufficient and necessary condition for a country to be a
tax haven is that it has little or no tax on relevant income (Ambrosanio and Caroppo,
2005). Under the HTC initiative, tax haven countries are characterized as countries that
are unlikely to share information with other countries for the purpose of taxes, lack
transparency, or have firms that do not have substantial activity in the jurisdiction
(Kudrle, 2008).
Hines (2007a), on the other hand, uses a more general (and perhaps more
generous) characterization of tax havens: tax havens are small, well governed countries
with low tax rates.4 Besides tax advantages, tax havens offer multinational corporations
(MNCs) access to good infrastructure and offshore financing activities (Hines, 2005).
These countries also offer a relaxed regulatory system allowing firms and individuals
access to business and bank secrecy (Palan, 2002).
4

Dharmapala and Hines (2006) present empirical evidence supporting the argument that tax havens have
good institutions such as voice and accountability, rule law, government effectiveness, political stability
and control of corruption.
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Tax haven regimes are manifested in many different varieties reflecting the
heterogeneity of countries and firms that seek tax haven opportunities. Kudrle (2008)
highlights notable differences in geographic location and income. Desai et al. (2006a)
note the relevance of size differences among tax havens in that American MNCs use
large and small tax havens for different purposes. Tax havens strategically develop tax
regimes to target specific sectors and to distinguish themselves from each other.
Preferential tax regimes fall into several categories (Ambrosanio and Caroppo,
2005; Palan, 2002): tax havens may have no income or corporate taxes, low taxes, no
taxes on income of foreign sources, or special tax privileges for certain industries or
companies. The main service provided across tax havens also varies (Kudrle and Eden,
2003). Production havens have low corporate taxes and grant special privileges so as to
encourage foreign firms to produce in the country. Headquarters havens allow foreign
firms to lower corporate tax earnings in the home jurisdiction. Sham havens allow
corporations and individuals to take advantage of the lack of regulation. Secrecy havens
are used by individuals and corporations to evade taxes through secrecy laws.
From a theoretical standpoint, the impact of tax competition on tax havens is
ambiguous. In the basic models of tax competition, introduced by Oates (1972) and
developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) tax competition has a negative effect (See
Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and Wilson (1990) for recent literature reviews). Countries
lower their tax rates to attract capital, which leads to a decrease in government spending
and the underprovision of public goods. In contrast, tax competition in a Tiebout (1956)
world can bring positive effects. Governments compete for mobile individuals who vote
with their feet by locating in jurisdictions with the most favorable combination of taxes
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and public goods provision. Such fiscal competition leads to an efficient provision of
public goods and places pressure on governments to keep taxes low.
Related models of tax competition promote the idea that tax competition “tames
the leviathan” and leads to a more efficient allocation of resources (Wilson and Wildasin,
2004). For example, Honkapohja and Turunen-Red (2007) argue that tax competition
creates a strong incentive to expand output. Hong and Smart (2006) posit that tax
planning can be socially optimal. Eggert and Sorensen (2008) use a theoretical model to
show that the efficiency of the public sector increases with more tax competition.
Agglomeration models, in contrast, suggest that tax competition does not
necessarily lead to lower taxes. According to Baldwin and Krugman’s (2000) model,
some countries do not need to reduce taxes since high taxes will be offset by the benefits
of industrial agglomeration. In these models, tax competition leads to a “race to the top”
and not to a “race to the bottom”.
Empirical evidence shows that tax revenues have not declined with the fall in
corporate taxes over time due to the broadening of tax bases (Hines, 2007c; Devereux et
al., 2002). It is argued that tax competition and levels of FDI are related, where countries
with lower taxes tend to attract more FDI (Hines, 2007b). In addition, higher taxes are
associated with lower levels of affiliate assets and output (Desai et al., 2006a). Mutti
(2003) argues that FDI inflows resulting from lowering tax rates have significant positive
externalities on the economy, such as technology transfers and greater capital
accumulation. These positive spillovers allow the economy to grow at a faster rate. In
contrast, Lee (2005) suggests that there is only anecdotal evidence regarding the impact
of tax incentives on foreign investment.
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The impact of proximity to tax haven activity has also been investigated. Desai,
Foley, and Hines (2007a,b) argue that increased activity in tax havens spills over to the
benefit of nearby non-tax havens. Rose and Spiegel (2007) present evidence that
proximity to tax havens serving as offshore financial centers (OFCs) leads to greater
financial depth and competitiveness in the financial sector of a non-OFC country.
Furthermore, Blanco and Rogers (2009) show that proximity to tax havens has a positive
impact on the level of FDI of less developed countries. The impact of proximity to a tax
haven may be different for tax havens which directly compete for FDI than for non-tax
havens.
To summarize, the literature review highlights three main points. First, the
impact of tax competition on heterogeneous tax havens is ambiguous. Second, there is an
established link between tax haven policies and FDI inflows. Third, there is evidence
that proximity to competing tax haven countries may influence FDI inflows.

Empirical Hypotheses
Based on the literature review, we analyze the impacts of tax competition on tax
havens using two approaches, both of which consider proximity of a tax haven and its
closest tax haven neighbor. Specifically, we investigate how distance between a tax
haven and its closest tax haven neighbor affects (i) FDI inflows and (ii) the presence of
American MNCs. The empirical hypotheses that we study are the following:

Hypothesis 1: Proximity to the nearest tax haven will influence FDI inflows in a tax
haven country.
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Hypothesis 2: Proximity to the nearest a tax haven will influence the level of American
Affiliates in a tax haven country.

The predicted impact of proximity is ambiguous. Geographical distance is
commonly used as a proxy for transportation costs in trade flow models (e.g., Mullen and
Williams, 2011). Agglomeration and spillover effects are more likely when a country is
closer to a neighboring tax haven due to lower costs associated with trade. The ability to
attract foreign investment, however, may be difficult when other tax haven competitors
are in closer proximity. If investors first select a favorable region in which to invest
based on location factors (Nissan and Niroomand, 2010), then tax policies become more
important and competitive on the margin. Thus, the net impact of proximity will depend
on which influences are more important in driving foreign investment outcomes for our
sample of tax haven countries.

3. Research Methodology
We define countries to be tax havens according to the classification used in
Dharmapala and Hines (2006).5 To investigate tax competition effects on FDI inflows,
we use annual FDI observations between 1991 and 2005 for a sample of 18 tax havens.6
Our baseline specification is as follows:
(1)

FDI it  1it TH _ proximity  ' X it   it

5

Appendix 1 shows the countries identified as tax havens by Dharmapala and Hines (2006).
See Appendix 2 for a list of countries included in our analysis. Some countries in Dharmapala and Hines
(2006) are not included because of data unavailability. We include 15 observations per country for a total
of 270 observations.
6

7

The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual FDI inflows. FDI
inflows were obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
The tax haven proximity variable (TH_proximity) is the inverse of the natural logarithm
of the distance to the nearest tax haven. It is constructed using distances calculated by
Mayer and Zignago (2006) for 31 of the 35 the tax havens identified in Appendix 1.7 A
positive estimated coefficient on TH_proximity would indicate that FDI inflows are larger
in tax havens that are closer to the nearest neighboring tax haven. Therefore, a positive
(negative) coefficient implies that being closer to another tax haven is beneficial
(harmful) and that tax havens are good (bad) neighbors for other tax havens.
The vector X represents a set of control variables identified in previous empirical
analyses as important determinants of FDI.8 In the baseline model, the control variables
include the natural logarithm of population, exchange rate, and openness to trade. The
natural logarithm of the initial level of real GDP per capita is also included as control
variable.9 Furthermore, time fixed effects are considered in the estimation.10 A
description of the variables and their sources is presented in Table 1 and summary
statistics are given in Table 2.
We also analyze competition between tax havens by looking at the impact of tax
haven proximity on the activity of American multinational corporations (MNCs) located
in tax havens. For this part of the analysis, the baseline specification in equation 1 is
7

Mayer and Zignago (2006) use the great circle formula to calculate the distance from the most important
cities and agglomerations of one country to another. See their note on the calculations at
http://www.cepii.fr/distance/noticedist_en.pdf. Distance is missing for 4 of the tax haven countries
identified in Appendix 1. Our approach to determine the impact of proximity to a tax haven is similar to
Rose’s and Spiegel (2006) approach.
8
Blonigen (2005) presents a comprehensive literature review on the determinants of FDI.
9
Although several empirical analyses use the current level of GDP as a control variable, we use the initial
level of GDP because FDI and GDP may be simultaneously determined.
10
Time fixed effects are eliminated by subtracting the mean of each variable calculated for each countryyear. Country fixed effects could not be included since the distance to a tax haven is time invariant.
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estimated using the number of American MNCs affiliates in a tax haven as the dependent
variable. Annual observations include the years 1999 to 2005 for 19 countries.11 The
number of affiliates of American MNCs was obtained from the US Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA).12 A description of these variables is presented in Table 1, and summary
statistics for this sample are shown in Table 3.

Assumptions and Spatial Error Model
We investigate whether a spatial error model is appropriate for our investigation.
The spatial error model corrects for the potential bias that would result if the FDI inflows
in one country is correlated with the FDI inflows of nearby countries.13 When spatial
dependence is expected in the disturbance term in an OLS estimator is not efficient and
produces biased standard errors (Anselin, 1999). Following convention, we use the Wald
test to find evidence of a spatial correlation in the error term.14
The error term in the spatial error model is specified as follows:
(2)

 it  W  uit

where λ represents the coefficient for the spatially correlated error, and W is a NxN
weighting matrix. W is constructed following Blonigen et al. (2007), where W consist of
TxT matrices of dimension IxI (T represents the number of periods and I the number of
countries). The diagonal matrices are symmetric matrices of the ratio of the shortest bi-
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The sample period and included countries were selected based on data availability. 19 countries were
included for a total of 133 observations (7 observations per country) . See Appendix 2 for a list of countries
included
12
The BEA website provides data for foreign affiliates in all countries in which investment was reported
(name of excel worksheet online, link provided in the references section).
13
See Anselin (1999) and Anselin et al. (2008) for reviews of spatial econometric models. Elhorst (2003)
discusses fixed effects spatial error models.
14
See LeSage (1999) for a helpful review of how to test for the presence of spatially correlated errors.
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lateral distance in the sample and the bi-lateral distance from country j to country k,
where the weight for the countries with the shortest distance is equal to 1.15 The other
matrices that compose W are matrices of zeros of dimensions IxI.
The spatial error model is estimated with the maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE) and W is normalized so that each row sums to unity.16 If errors are spatially
correlated, the assumption that the error term is normally distributed is rejected. Given
the potential for structural instability in the form of non-constant error variances, we
estimate the spatial error model with robust standard errors. To check that we are using
an adequate model, we employ the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) which indicates no
evidence of multicollinearity.17

4. Findings and Discussion
Table 4 shows the estimation results using total FDI inflows as the dependent
variable. In all the estimations shown in Table 4, the Wald statistic (and the significance
of lambda) provides strong evidence that the error term is spatially correlated.
Accordingly, we focus our discussion on the spatial error model estimates because the
presence of spatial correlation implies that OLS estimator is no longer efficient and
provides biased standard errors.18

15

The non-diagonal terms in the diagonal matrices of the W matrix represent the distance between the most
important cities and agglomerations across counties (provided by Mayer and Zignago, 2006). In the
estimates using total FDI as dependent variable, the W matrix is composed of 225 matrices of dimension
18x18. In the estimates using the affiliates of American MNCs as dependent variable, the W matrix is
composed by 49 matrices of dimension 19x19.
16
Our estimates show robust standard errors since the estimator of variance uses the Huber/White estimator
instead of the traditional calculation.
17
VIFs for all variables in the models were less than 7 (there is evidence of multicolinearity when the
largest VIF is greater than 10). See Baum (2006, p.85) for information about this test in Stata.
18
The OLS estimates are not included for brevity but are available upon request.
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Column 1, in Table 4, shows the estimates from the baseline specification using
the spatial error model. The estimated coefficient for tax haven proximity is negative and
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This indicates that being closer to the
nearest tax haven is predicted to be associated with lower FDI inflows. A one standard
deviation increase in proximity to the closest tax haven would lead to an estimated .5 (or
approximately .04 million US dollars) decrease in the natural log of FDI inflows.
We explore the potential nonlinear effect of tax haven proximity by including the
tax haven proximity variable as well as its squared value in the basic specification.
Estimates are shown in column 2 of Table 4. According to the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC), the model with the squared term is preferred over the model with the
only the linear term.19 The coefficient on the proximity variable remains negative and of
the same order magnitude and the squared proximity terms is positive and significant.
This suggests that the competition effect (represented by the linear term) is mitigated by
the square of the inverse of the distance term. Combined, the coefficients suggest that
closer proximity to the nearest tax haven is associated with greater FDI inflows. We
interpret this as an indication of spillover effects from tax havens to nearby tax havens.
To further explore the nature of competition between tax havens we include a
variable that accounts for FDI inflows to the closest tax haven (in natural log), and these
estimates are shown in column 3 of Table 4. While the coefficient of the FDI inflows to
the closest tax is negative, it is not significantly related to total FDI inflows.
19

We explored also a nonlinear form including the cubed of the tax haven proximity variable. According to
the BIC, the model with the squared term is preferred. The difference between the BICs of the models with
only the linear form of tax haven proximity and the one with the squared term is equal to 10.33, which is
indicative of very strong support for the model with the squared term because it is greater than 10. The
difference of the BICs between the model with the squared term and cubed term is only equal to 1.08. We
do not include results of the model that includes tax haven proximity to the cube for purpose of space, but
these results are available upon request.
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Next, we explore whether our results are robust to excluding those countries that
are outliers. In our sample, Hong Kong and Luxemburg have levels of FDI inflows that
are more than one standard deviation above the mean. Estimates excluding Hong Kong
and Luxemburg as independent observations and using only the linear tax haven
proximity term are shown in column 4 of Table 4.20 When we explore the nonlinear form
of tax haven proximity using this restricted sample, we find that the model with just the
linear term is preferred to the model with the linear and the squared term.21 Estimates
using this sample also support the hypothesis that there is competition between tax
havens. Combined, with our previous results (c.f. Table 4, column 2), it appears that the
inclusion of Hong Kong and Luxemburg drives the apparent spillover effects found in the
non-linear specification of proximity. Thus, while Hong Kong and Luxemburg enjoy the
benefit of spillovers from the nearby tax havens, the other tax havens are more influenced
by tax competition pressure.
Table 5 presents the estimates of the spatial error model using the number of
American MNCs affiliates in tax havens as dependent variable. In all the estimations
shown in Table 5 we reject the hypothesis of no spatially correlated error terms at the 1
percent level. As shown in column 1, the estimated coefficient on tax haven proximity is
negative and significant at the 1 percent level. Increasing the tax haven proximity
variable by one standard deviation results in an estimated increase in the natural log of
number of affiliates by 0.34; representing a predicted increase of one affiliate
(approximately 0.06). Estimates including the squared term of tax haven proximity are
20

Hong Kong and Luxemburg are still present in the model in that they are the closest tax haven for some
of the tax havens included in the sample. Thus, we don’t simulate a world without their FDI flows.
21
We consider the models with the squared of tax haven proximity and with the cubed term. Looking at the
BICs, the linear model is preferred over the other models because it has a lower BIC. Estimates not
included for purpose of space, but available upon request.
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shown in column 2 of Table 5. According to the BICs for the two models, shown in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, there is strong support for the model with the squared term.22
Once again, there is evidence of spillover effects among tax havens.23
Column 3 of Table 5 show the estimates when the natural log of affiliates in
closest tax haven is included as an explanatory variable instead of the tax haven
proximity variable. The estimated coefficient for the affiliates variable is positive and
significant at the 1 percent level. Notably this finding seemingly contradicts the previous
findings, where being closer to the nearest neighboring tax haven was associated with
less economic activity in a tax haven. According to agglomeration models of tax
competition, however, firms tend to concentrate in specific areas. Estimates from column
3 suggest that as if there is a one standard deviation increase in the natural log of the
number of affiliates in the closest tax haven, then the number of affiliates in a tax haven
increases by 0.3; which represents an increase of one half affiliate (approximately 0.5).
We also explore whether there is a nonlinear effect of the number of tax haven
affiliates in the closest tax haven, and find support for a model that includes the square
and the cube of the number of affiliates of American MNCs.24 Estimates for the model
that considers the cubed term of the number of American MNCs affiliates in the closest
tax haven as shown in column 4 of Table 5 is similar to previous results. Including the
cubed proximity term, we observe a positive impact when the closest tax haven has
between 0 to 10 affiliates. If the number of affiliates in the closest tax haven is greater
22

Absolute difference between BICs is equal to 7.18.
We also explore with a model that included the cubed term of tax haven proximity variable, but find no
support for this model since it had higher BIC than the model with the squared term of tax haven proximity.
24
We evaluate the BICs of three models: 1) with the linear term of the number of affiliates in the closest
tax haven, 2) with the squared term, and 3) with the cubed term. According the BICs, there is very strong
support for the model that includes the cube term. Estimates for the model with the squared term not
included for purpose of space, but are available upon request.
23
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than 10, then we observe a negative relationship between the number of affiliates in a tax
haven and the number of its closest tax haven neighbor. Thus, this nonlinear model shows
that the spillover effect is limited and not indefinite.
To check for robustness, we estimate our model excluding those countries with
the largest number of American MNCs affiliates. Specifically, we exclude Hong Kong,
Ireland, and Switzerland because they show a very high number of American affiliates
relative to the other countries in our sample. Estimates using this restricted sample are
shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5. Excluding these countries from the sample, the
linear models have a better fit. The results suggest that being nearer to the closest tax
haven leads to an estimated decrease in the number of American MNCs affiliates. On the
other hand, as the number of American MNCs affiliates increases in the closest tax
haven, we observe an increase in American MNCs affiliates in a specific country.
Geography plays an important role in reconciling the different impacts of
American affiliates. The combined results suggest that tax havens compete with each
other to attract MNCs in the first place (the negative impact of proximity of nearest tax
haven on affiliate levels in the linear model that excludes Hong Kong and Luxemburg).
When making a decision concerning where to locate in a specific region, MNCs evaluate
the tax haven options, which results in observed competition between tax havens.
However, there are positive agglomeration effects: tax havens with higher levels of
affiliates in the closest tax haven neighbor have higher levels themselves (the positive
effect of the number of American affiliates in the nearest tax haven). Thus, if a firm is
already in a tax haven and it wants to expand, then it is likely that the firm will be
interested in having an affiliate in nearby low tax jurisdictions (i.e. tax haven).
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To study these opposing forces in more depth, we investigate the presence of the
top 500 American companies in tax havens as specified by the Forbes 500 list of 2008.
We investigate the number of affiliates that each of these companies has in a tax haven
according to the directory of American firms operating in foreign countries.25 Forty-six
percent of the top 500 American firms have at least one affiliate in a tax haven, and 36
percent have an affiliate in more than one tax haven. In fact, the probability of having
more than one tax affiliate, given that the firm has one tax haven affiliate, is equal to 77
percent. The tax haven countries with the highest number of American subsidiaries are
Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, and Ireland (in descending order).26 There is an
apparent synergy between tax haven subsidiaries in these locations. Given that a firm has
a subsidiary in Singapore, there is a 79 percent probability of having a subsidiary in Hong
Kong; and given that the firm has a subsidiary in Hong Kong, there is a 77 percent of
probability that the firm has a subsidiary in Singapore. In the case of Ireland and
Switzerland, we find similar results. Given that a firm has a subsidiary in Ireland, there is
a 66 percent of probability of having a subsidiary in Switzerland; and given that a firm
has a subsidiary in Switzerland, there is a probability of 58 percent that the firm has a
subsidiary in Ireland.

4. Conclusion
There are two main empirical findings from this analysis. First, proximity to the
closest tax haven is negatively related to FDI inflows and the number of American
25

This directory is provided by the Uniworld Business Publications, where the 19th edition published in
2007 was the latest edition available at the time this study was undertaken.
26
In Hong Kong there are 158 firms that have an affiliate, in Singapore 154, in Switzerland 125, and
Ireland 111. These four destinations are important since in the next most attractive destination, Luxemburg,
there is only presence of 37 firms.
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subsidiaries in a tax haven. These results suggest that there is race to the bottom between
tax havens, where they all compete for mobile capital and geographic location relative to
other countries matters. The policy implication is that as a group, tax haven countries
experience potentially harmful impacts from tax competition and have reason to support
initiatives aimed at international tax harmonization between themselves.
Our second main finding is that agglomeration benefits are evident for firms when
they decide where to locate subsidiaries. As the number of American affiliates in the
closest tax haven increases, there is an increase in the number of affiliates in a tax haven.
This result suggests that there are positive spillovers among neighboring tax havens.
Given that a firm is already located in a tax haven, there is a higher probability that it will
expand operations to a nearby tax haven. Accordingly, tax havens may benefit by being
nearer to other tax havens with high presence of American firm affiliates. This
agglomeration benefit is likely to be observed once a MNC has already settled in the
nearby tax haven. This effect contrasts with the competition effect, where tax havens
compete for the initial capital investment and future capital inflows. In sum, our findings
suggest that agglomeration benefits are important for firms and that the nature of the
competition between tax havens changes once there is a subsidiary in the nearby tax
haven. In addition, the pressure of tax competition appears to be less distinct for the
countries that attract a disproportionate amount of FDI (Hong Kong and Luxemburg).
Our analysis provides important insights related to the global economy and how
tax havens interact with each other. We find that tax havens compete with each for capital
flows, which is consistent with Dash and Sharma’s (2011) finding for developing
countries. The evidence provided by this study tells us that government policy in tax
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havens is likely to be shaped by the competition they face, where these countries will find
ways to make themselves more attractive than the nearby tax haven. There is likely to be
strategic behavior across tax havens in relation to taxation and other incentives to FDI.
Our analysis also shows that there are significant spillovers in nearby tax havens
once a MNC has chosen to locate in a specific tax haven. This suggests that tax havens
would likely benefit by marketing themselves to corporations who have operations in
nearby tax havens. Agglomerations effects are evident from our analysis, where tax
havens can benefit from activity in nearby tax havens if they are able to make themselves
appealing. We might observe that tax havens nearby have incentives that target specific
industries with the purpose to take advantage of agglomeration.
There are many fruitful avenues for further research. In particular, extensions
should explore the implications of tax competition between tax haven regimes with
different characteristics. As discussed in the literature review, the group of tax havens is
a heterogeneous group and determining the relevance of location for competition between
these countries is important. In addition, future research might evaluate not only the
location of American MNCs but also their level of sales, employment or assets in tax
havens. Such factors are undoubtedly important for gaining a better understanding of the
role of tax competition and geography among tax havens. Finally, looking at whether
nearby tax havens have a tendency to offer similar incentives might be a way to learn
more about the existent competition and spillovers effects.
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Table 1. Variable description and source

Variable name
Ln(FDI)

Variable description and source
Natural log of the inflow of foreign direct investment (US
dollars, millions). Source: UNCTAD.

Ln(Affiliates)

Natural log of the number of affiliates of American MNCs.
Source: BEA.

TH_proximity

Inverse of the natural log of the distance (in kilometers) to the
closest tax haven (as defined by Dharmapala and Hines, 2006,
see Appendix 1). We use the distance calculated with the
latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities and
agglomerations. Source: Mayer and Zignago (2006).

Ln(FDI in closest
TH)

Natural log of the inflow of foreign direct investment in closest
tax haven (US dollars, millions). Source: UNCTAD.

Ln(Affiliates in
closest TH)

Natural log of number of affiliates of American MNCs in
closest tax haven. Source: BEA.

Ln(exchange rate)

Natural log of exchange rate. Source: WDI.

Ln(GDP initial)

Natural log of the initial level of real GDP per capita (constant
2000 US dollars). Source: WDI.

Ln(openness)

Natural log of exports plus imports divided by real GDP.
Source: WDI.

Ln(population)

Natural log of population. Source: WDI.

Institutions

Average of six different indicators of governance (rule of law,
control of corruption, voice and accountability, government
effectiveness, political stability, and regulatory quality).
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007).
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Table 2. Summary statistics – Sample: FDI inflows (from all countries) in tax havens

Mean
Ln(FDI)
5.038
TH_proximity
0.186
Ln(FDI in closest TH)
4.979
Ln(GDP initial)
8.667
Ln(population)
13.145
Ln(exchange rate)
1.149
Ln(openness)
4.887
Institutions
0.649
All variables have 270 observations

Std. Dev.
2.652
0.039
3.436
0.969
1.684
1.976
0.363
0.590

Min
0.000
0.126
-3.114
7.134
10.600
-1.143
3.924
-0.369

Max
11.693
0.243
11.693
10.458
15.822
7.462
5.953
1.796

Table 3. Summary statistics – Sample: American MNCs activity in tax havens

Mean
Ln(Affiliates)
2.353
TH_proximity
0.183
Ln(Affiliates in closest TH)
3.233
Ln(GDP initial)
9.602
Ln(population)
13.298
Ln(exchange rate)
1.311
Ln(openness)
4.841
Institutions
0.559
All variables have 133 observations

Std. Dev.
2.165
0.041
2.468
2.228
1.694
2.021
0.413
0.784

Min
0.000
0.123
0.000
4.958
10.652
-1.065
3.860
-1.596

Max
6.314
0.243
6.314
15.773
15.822
7.318
5.953
1.830
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Table 4. Spatial Error Model Estimates: FDI inflows1

Independent variable
TH proximity

(1)
-12.922***
(4.607)

TH proximity(sq)

(2)
-12.868***
(4.020)
499.485***
(142.223)

Ln(FDI in closest TH)
Ln(GDP initial)
Ln(population)
Ln(exchange rate)
Ln(openness)
Institutions
Constant
Lambda (λWε)

0.447
(0.305)
0.511***
(0.090)
0.241***
(0.093)
2.021***
(0.466)
1.569***
(0.599)
-0.035
(0.173)
0.444***
(0.074)

0.712**
(0.298)
0.465***
(0.090)
0.291***
(0.091)
2.813***
(0.505)
0.928
(0.593)
-0.790***
(0.247)
0.408***
(0.075)

(3)

-0.017
(0.048)
0.315
(0.324)
0.637***
(0.100)
0.167*
(0.088)
1.861***
(0.457)
1.639**
(0.659)
-0.028
(0.169)
0.415***
(0.079)

(4)
-11.665***
(4.385)

0.677***
(0.254)
0.408***
(0.092)
-0.044
(0.103)
-0.628
(0.758)
0.296
(0.553)
0.412*
(0.221)
0.381***
(0.093)

Observations
270
270
270
240
Log-likelihood
-515.70
-507.70
-521.60
-454.90
Wald statistic (Chi-square)
35.73
29.45
27.77
16.78
BIC
1081.81
1071.48
1093.67
959.05
1
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Dependent variable: FDI inflows (natural log)
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 5. Spatial Error Model Estimates: Annual American Affiliates1
Independent variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
TH proximity
-8.315***
-10.065***
(2.462)
(2.456)
TH proximity(sq)
320.541***
(105.487)
Ln(Affiliates in closest TH)
0.124***
(0.034)
Ln(Affiliates in closest TH)2

(4)

(5)
-11.022***
(2.531)

0.822***
(0.134)
-0.108**
(0.051)
Ln(Affiliates in closest TH)3
-0.103***
(0.019)
Ln(GDP initial)
-0.408***
-0.243**
-0.490***
-0.425***
0.031
(0.111)
(0.099)
(0.114)
(0.087)
(0.119)
Ln(population)
1.044***
1.017***
1.148***
1.018***
0.645***
(0.064)
(0.056)
(0.055)
(0.054)
(0.109)
Ln(exchange rate)
0.527***
0.249*
0.562***
0.477***
-0.088
(0.169)
(0.142)
(0.173)
(0.130)
(0.158)
Ln(openness)
1.084***
0.312
0.982***
1.657***
-0.284
(0.200)
(0.325)
(0.222)
(0.253)
(0.605)
Institutions
2.472***
2.404***
2.373***
1.899***
1.011***
(0.413)
(0.331)
(0.426)
(0.311)
(0.382)
Constant
-0.007
-0.544**
-0.007
0.719**
-0.344
(0.175)
(0.264)
(0.189)
(0.326)
(0.259)
Lambda (λWε)
0.554***
0.602***
0.583***
0.584***
0.687***
(0.104)
(0.095)
(0.101)
(0.097)
(0.091)
Observations
133
133
133
133
112
Log-likelihood
-178.60
-172.50
-181.00
-163.80
-134.70
Wald statistic (Chi-square)
28.41
39.93
33.54
36.14
56.92
BIC
401.12
393.94
405.97
381.34
311.91
1
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Dependent variable: Number of affiliates (natural log)
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively

(6)

0.082**
(0.033)

-0.135
(0.113)
0.908***
(0.110)
0.06
(0.149)
-0.452
(0.623)
1.344***
(0.439)
-0.182
(0.250)
0.673***
(0.098)
112
-143.50
47.21
329.38
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Appendix 1. Countries Classified as Tax havens by Darmaphala and Hines (2006)
Andorra
Channel Islands*
Lebanon
Anguilla
Cook Islands
Liberia
Antigua and Barbuda Cyprus
Liechtenstein*
Bahamas
Dominica
Luxembourg
Bahrain
Gibraltar
Macao
Barbados
Grenada
Maldives
Belize
Hong Kong
Malta
Bermuda
Ireland
Marshall Islands
British Virgin Islands Isle of Man*
Monaco*
Cayman Islands
Jordan
Montserrat
*Distance data from Mayer and Zignago (2006) is not available.

Netherlands Antilles
Panama
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and Gren.
Singapore
Switzerland
Turks and Caicos
Vanuatu

Appendix 2. Sample of Tax Havens use in Estimates*
Antigua and Barbuda
Hong Kong
Luxembourg
St. Lucia
Bahrain
Ireland
Macao
St. Vincent and Gren.
Belize
Jordan
Malta
Switzerland
Dominica
Lebanon
Panama
Vanuatu
Grenada
Liberiai
St. Kitts & Nevis
i
Not included in estimates of FDI inflows
*Sample for total FDI includes 18 countries and sample for American MNC affiliate
includes 19 countries.
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